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Executive summary
European countries continue to pride themselves on their rich industrial 
heritage and strong global position in high-end manufacturing. Yet the 
underlying reality is that manufacturing is playing a steadily diminishing 
role in both employment and output. In contrast, the services sector 
accounts for around two-thirds of total output in the EU, and for four-
fifths of growth in recent years. In terms of employment growth, the 
dominance of services is even more striking. With few exceptions, 
manufacturing employment in the EU has contracted, total employment 
expansion thus being accounted for either by services or by construction. 
Reflecting the emphasis on the services sector in the EU2020 strategy, 
this study highlights some key features of the services sector in the EU, 
including productivity and innovation in market services. One important 
observation is is that the services sector accounts for as much as three-
quarters of cross-country differences in economic growth across 
individual EU countries. Relatively fast-growing countries have also 
typically had above-average productivity growth. Even though 
productivity growth is generally lower in the services sector than in 
manufacturing, it nevertheless accounts for a large share of aggregate 
growth in output per employee because of its large size. Countries with 
high aggregate productivity growth also tend to have relatively higher 
productivity growth in services.4             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
But the services sector consists of a very disparate group of subsectors, 
with varying productivity performance and very different mechanisms 
for enhancing output per employee. The study points to three key 
ingredients in services sector productivity expansion. 
The first is tangible fixed investment. On average, market services have 
as much fixed capital per employee as manufacturing, but this capital 
stock is more skewed towards buildings and information and 
communications technology. These investments have been shown to 
contribute substantially to productivity growth in several key services 
subsectors. 
A second element is intangible capital. Services industries attain higher 
productivity by combining investment in fixed capital, new computer 
software and human capital so as to create new organisational structures 
and business models, and sometimes entirely new service products. But 
cross-country differences in the EU are substantial, in terms of both 
tangible and intangible investment.
A third element is that services sector innovation, in contrast to that in 
manufacturing, draws less on in-house knowledge creation in the form 
of R&D. Services industries tend to innovate in interaction with customers, 
suppliers and competitors. There is also substantial scope for productivity 
improvements by adopting best practice, both within and between 
certain service industries. The lower level of in-house knowledge creation 
partially reflects smaller average firm size in services industries. This 
greater reliance on external sourcing of new knowledge suggests that 
cluster formation fostering knowledge transfers and spillovers is an 
important element in supporting services sector innovation.Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  5           6             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
Introduction 1. 
The expansion of output and trade in manufactured goods constituted 
the engine of prosperity in Europe for much of the past century. Even 
today, European countries pride themselves on their manufacturing 
heritage and retain a global technological lead in many industries. But 
when we look more closely at economic growth in Europe, we see that 
manufacturing has long taken the back seat to services industries, in 
terms of both output and employment. Meanwhile, the manufacturing 
firms themselves have become increasingly service focused, partly as a 
means to remain competitive in a world economy where more and 
more commoditised goods are being produced in developing countries 
offering lower costs of production. 
It is not unlikely that the economic crisis of recent years has speeded 
up this process of deindustrialisation in Europe, as a number of 
traditional sectors are confronted with overcapacity. Yet, the EU 
economy must find ways to expand faster in coming years in order 
both to replace the jobs lost during the crisis and to provide incomes 
with which excessive debt burdens are to be reduced. Given that the 
medium-term downtrend in manufacturing employment will not likely 
reverse, future growth in employment and incomes is likely to centre 
on services.
This study aims to explore some key features of the services sector. 
Chapter 2 takes stock of the role of services in economic growth and 
employment. Chapter 3 looks at fixed tangible investment in services, 
relative to other sectors. Chapter 4 provides a mapping of intangible 
investment across European countries. Chapter 5, finally, looks at the 
process of innovation in services. Since this study focuses on longer-
term trends, and partly for reasons of data availability, the current 
economic downturn will not be addressed specifically. There are also 
other omitted elements, such as the functioning of labour, product 
and financial markets, regulation, competition, and firm demographics. Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  7           
“Framework policies” targeting these elements are clearly important 
for innovation and growth in services, but they are not specific to 
services per se.
  The role of services in EU economic  2. 
growth
Total gross output in the economy (Gross Domestic Product, GDP) is the 
sum of gross value added in all its sectors. These comprise 
Agricul   • ture
Construction   •
Manufacturing   •
Services   •
Utiliti   • es and other industry
This section sheds some light on the sectoral composition of economic 
growth in the EU and the US using primarily OECD data on sector value 
added and employment (“EU” is here represented by the EU-15 for 
reasons of data availability). We look at the last 10-year period for which 
disaggregated data is available for all countries, typically covering the 
decade up to 2005. The sectoral decomposition and time periods are 
slightly different for the EU aggregate and for the UK, for which only 
European Commission data are available.
2.1    The services sector has been a key engine of 
growth
At the aggregate as well as the sectoral level, growth in output (i.e. gross 
value added) is the sum of two components: growth in employment and 
growth in output per employee (also referred to here as labour productivity, 
although this is a slight simplification since output per employee is also 
affected by the average number of hours worked by each employee).8             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
The sectoral perspective allows us to address several questions. Is 
economic growth at the national level broad-based or propelled by just a 
few sectors? Similarly, are cross-country differences in economic growth 
broad-based or concentrated to differences in certain sectors? Finally, 
does the composition of growth between employment and productivity 
differ across sectors?
Starting with the aggregate picture, the services sector dominates the 
EU economy in both level and growth terms. The services sector 
accounts for around two-thirds of total value added and for four-fifths 
of real value added growth in the decade to 2005. The services sector 
also accounts for as much as three-quarters of cross-country differences 
in economic growth across individual EU countries. With a few 
exceptions, such as Sweden, Finland and Ireland, high-growth countries 
have mostly expanded on account of their services sectors, not 
manufacturing. 
In terms of employment growth, the dominance of services is even more 
striking. With few exceptions, manufacturing employment has 
contracted. It should be noted here that the EU as a whole experienced 
relatively favourable conditions for employment growth during this 
period, Germany being an exception caused in part by the contraction in 
construction. Spain, Luxembourg and Ireland saw particularly strong 
employment growth in the services sector, augmented in the case of 
Ireland and Spain by rising employment in the construction sector. In 
retrospect, it is now clear that part of this construction-driven 
employment growth was linked to unsustainable real estate booms, and 
has contracted sharply during the recession.
2.2    In some sectors growth is propelled by 
employment, in others by productivity
A way to better understand the drivers of growth is to decompose it by 
growth in employment and growth in labour productivity (here proxied Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  9           
by gross value added per employee)1 . On average in the EU as a whole, 
economic growth has been driven in equal shares by productivity and 
employment, as shown in Figure 1. While there is not a uniform pattern 
across countries, those with high output growth have typically also had 
above-average productivity growth. This is true for the US, and in the EU, 
for the UK, Sweden, Finland, Greece and Ireland. There are two notable 
exceptions: Output in Spain and Luxembourg has expanded largely due 
to rising employment, not productivity. Ireland, finally, has enjoyed high 
employment growth on top of its high productivity growth.
 
Figure 1:    Sources of economic growth (contribution to annual real 
























































































































Source:  OECD and European Commission 
Note:    UK and EU-15 data are from the European Commission, for 1994-2004
The relative growth contributions of productivity and employment 
differs markedly across different sectors of the economy. A shown in 
1    Labour productivity is in turn a combination of capital deepening and total factor productivity 
growth (TFP).10             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
Figure 2 for the EU-15 as a whole, in agriculture and manufacturing, large 
productivity gains have been accompanied by declining employment. In 
construction the situation is the reverse. In services, finally, output has 
been driven mostly by employment, but productivity growth has also 
been positive. As we will show later on, this productivity growth is in fact 
very important for aggregate growth performance.
Figure 2:    Sources of sectoral growth in the EU-15 (contribution to 
annual value added growth 1995-2005, %)
Employment










Source:  European Commission Economic Forecast database (AMECO)
Zooming in on services, there are differences across countries. Sweden, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece, Ireland and the UK have all seen 
notable gains in services sector productivity, as has the US. In a number 
of other countries, however, productivity growth in services has been 
negligible, and in the case of Spain negative.
While much of the public discourse on R&D has concentrated on the 
resources that countries invest in R&D on an annual basis, what actually 
matters for economic growth is the stock of knowledge, as represented Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  11           
Box 1.    Output, employment and productivity in services:  
A closer look at selected subsectors
The services sector consists of a number of very different industries. 
For simplicity we have grouped these together into four major 
subsectors: Trade and tourism; Transport and communication; Finance 
and business services; and Social services. Figure 3 shows their 
respective contributions to total employment growth over the ten-
year period, for a selection of OECD countries. Finance and business 
services have constituted a particularly strong growth engine in many 
countries, on average accounting for around half of total growth in 
services sector output, with a slightly smaller contribution to 
employment growth. The role of this sector has been particularly 
prominent in Luxembourg, France, Belgium, and in the US. 
Unfortunately, this OECD data set does not include data for the UK.
Figure 3:    Growth in service sector employment (sub-sectoral 
contributions to average annual growth, 1995-2005, 
percent)
Social services Finance and business services
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by the R&D capital stock. The R&D capital stock accumulates gradually as 
a result of many years of investment in R&D, but it also depreciates as 
older knowledge becomes obsolete. If Europe would suddenly raise its 
level of R&D investment to meet the Lisbon target of 3 percent of GDP, 
this alone would not have an immediate impact on its economic 
performance. What is needed is a sustained increase in the level of 
investment that would over time expand Europe’s R&D capital stock. 
Figure 4 shows the decomposition of productivity growth by sector. In 
three of the five economies with high productivity growth (UK, US and 
the Netherlands), services have contributed substantially to high 
aggregate productivity growth. The few countries that have attained 
high productivity growth despite small contributions from services are 
unlikely to serve as useful role models for Europe as a whole. Finland and 
Austria, along with Ireland and Sweden (not included here), have 
benefited from large contributions from their manufacturing sectors. But 
Finland and Sweden benefited during this period from enhanced 
competitiveness in the aftermath of their large devaluations in the early 
There are notable differences both across sub-sectors and across 
countries in terms of productivity growth in services (measured as 
the ratio of real output over employment by sub-sector). 
Productivity growth has typically been higher in trade and tourism 
and in transport and communication. In contrast, it has been mostly 
negative in social services. Finance and business services fall 
in-between. Ireland and the US have both experienced positive 
productivity growth in this subsector. The Netherlands, Sweden 
and Greece stand out as European leaders in aggregate services 
sector productivity growth, which in these cases has been propelled 
largely by trade and tourism, and to some degree also by transport 
and communication.Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  13           
1990s, which provided substantial boosts to their manufacturing exports. 
Ireland, similarly, benefited from massive FDI inflows, especially from the 
US. These small and exceptionally open economies thus provide rather 
untypical examples of manufacturing-led growth that the rest of Europe 
cannot easily replicate.
Figure 4:    Sector composition of labour productivity growth (annual 
average growth 1995-2004, percentage points)















































































Source:  van Ark et al. (2008)
Figure 5, also based on the work of van Ark et al., shows a different 
decomposition of the same productivity growth. Instead of decomposing 
productivity by sector, it shows the contribution from different sources: 
capital deepening (i.e. equipping each worker with more productive 
capital); labour composition (i.e. changes in the quality of labour); and 
multifactor productivity (MFP), which is essentially efficiency gains and 
technological progress.14             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
Figure 5:    The composition of  labour productivity growth (all sectors, 
annual average growth 1995-2004, percentage points)
MFP
















































































Source  van Ark et al. (2008)
Two conclusions emerge from this decomposition. First, the growth 
contribution from fixed capital deepening is substantial, at just over 
1 percentage point for the EU and more so for the US. Second, while the 
growth contribution from capital deepening is relatively similar across 
countries, differences in growth performance across countries are largely 
driven by differences in MFP growth. Combined with the earlier 
observation that services are key to cross-country growth differentials, 
this suggests that efficiency gains in services may be an important driver 
of aggregate productivity growth.Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  15           
2.3    Manufacturing firms become service 
providers
Mirroring the macroeconomic shift towards services, global rankings of 
leading firms, such as the Fortune 500, contain more service companies 
than in previous decades. In some cases, manufacturing firms have 
transformed themselves into predominantly service-providing 
companies. One prominent example is IBM, which now considers itself 
primarily a service business, although it still makes computers. The 
production of physical goods has become secondary to firms that instead 
focus on the provision of “business solutions”. This transformation of 
manufacturing firms into service providers is part of a shift in the 
comparative advantage of advanced economies. As China and other 
lower cost producers move up the value added ladder in manufacturing, 
straight goods production has fallen under intense cost pressure. Many 
manufactured goods, for instance consumer electronics, have become 
commoditised. High income countries have lost competitiveness in such 
manufacturing. They have been able to stay competitive in part by 
shifting towards business solutions rather than the sale of products, as 
the price elasticity of demand for business solutions is lower than for 
hardware. This shift has been accompanied by a shift towards subscription 
pricing. Rather than receiving a single payment for a piece of 
manufactured equipment, many manufacturers are now receiving a 
revenue stream for ongoing contracts, which include a non-negligible 
service component. The management literature refers to this as the 
“servitisation of products”. For a discussion, see for instance Vandermerwe 
and Rada (1988).
To conclude, this chapter sets the stage for the discussion that follows. 
With few exceptions, high-growth OECD countries have prospered on 
account of their expanding services sectors. But what are the drivers of 
productivity growth in services? Tangible and intangible capital 
deepening are key elements, but unlike the manufacturing sector, 
innovation in services does not primarily stem from scientific R&D.   16             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
We need to embrace a broader definition of investment to understand 
services sector innovation.
  Fixed tangible investment is a key  3. 
driver of productivity growth in 
services
We saw in the previous chapter that although employment growth 
was the key driver of services sector expansion, productivity growth 
has also played a large role. Labour productivity in the EU services 
sector has expanded by about 1 percent per year from 1995 to 2005. 
Combined with their large share in aggregate output and employment, 
services account for a substantial portion of aggregate productivity 
growth in the EU. Those EU countries with the fastest-growing service 
sectors have often had particularly high productivity performance. 
This chapter sheds light on one of the key drivers of productivity 
growth: fixed tangible investment. The scope is somewhat narrower 
than that of the previous chapter, as it focuses on Market services, 
thus excluding the social services sub-sector. In addition to 
decomposing fixed investment by services sub-sector, we here also 
look at the composition of investment and capital stocks across asset 
types. The traditional split between non-residential construction and 
machinery & equipment is augmented with a further decomposition 
of the latter into ICT (information and communication technology) 
equipment, transport equipment, and other equipment. This further 
decomposition is important. Several studies have found that ICT-
capital deepening has been a particularly important driver of 
productivity gains in services. Our findings support this view, but 
there are also notable differences across sub-sectors.Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  17           
3.1    Capital deepening and productivity growth in 
Market services
Tangible investment has played an important role in fostering 
productivity in Market services in the EU over the past decade. Figure 6 
depicts the composition of average growth of real value added in Market 
services for the four largest EU countries, which represent about two 
thirds of the EU economy.2  Value added is a measure of GDP at the sector 
level. The pattern of growth is quite different across the various sectors 
— “Trade” (Wholesale and retail trade and repair, NACE sector G), 
“Tourism” (Hotels and restaurants, NACE sector H), Transport & 
Communication (Transport, storage and communication, NACE sector I), 
Finance (NACE sector J) and Business services (NACE sector K). Financial 
and business services account for close to 60 percent of total value added 
in Market services.
Economic growth can be achieved either through a larger number of 
hours worked in the economy (through higher employment or an 
increased number of hours worked per employee) or by making each 
worker more productive. Higher labour productivity, in turn, can be 
achieved by equipping each worker with more and better machinery, or 
with more skills. But higher labour productivity can also be the result of 
making the economy more efficient in its use of all factors of production, 
i.e. both labour and capital. This is commonly known either as Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) or Multifactor productivity (MFP).
Figure 6 shows the contribution to sectoral value added growth from 
these different elements. Capital deepening has in turn been 
decomposed into ICT and non-ICT capital.
 
2    This chapter is based on data from the EUKLEMS that provides detailed growth accounting results 
at the level of individual sectors for some 20 EU countries. Over and above the sector focus, it de-
livers improved growth analysis inter alia thanks to asset-specific capital inputs and by measuring 
labour in hours worked by skill groups. Due to lack of data for the EU as a whole, EU aggregates are 
based on own calculations. 18             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
Figure 6:    Growth composition in market services, 1995-2005 
(average growth in value added, %)
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Source:  EUKLEMS; own calculations
A first insight from the figure is that Transport & Communication grew 
most dynamically during this period, followed by Financial and business 
services, whereas Trade and tourism recorded a more moderate speed of 
growth. A second insight is that hours worked accounted for the bulk of 
growth in Tourism and for a substantial part of growth in Financial and 
business services. By contrast, growth in Trade as well as Transport & 
Communication was to a larger extent driven by productivity 
improvements. The latter fall into capital deepening, i.e. equipping each 
unit of labour with more ICT and non-ICT capital, and TFP. The third 
insight is that productivity growth was to a large extent propelled by 
capital deepening. While there are differences across sectors as to the 
relative importance of these two sources, the two largest sectors, 
Financial & business services on the one hand and Trade on the other, 
were characterized by capital-driven productivity advances. Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  19           
Last but not least, the contributions from ICT capital deepening are 
impressive, especially in Financial & business services considering that 
back in 1995, the total stock of computers, communication equipment 
and software (ICT capital) represented only a small share in the total 
tangible capital stock. The other aspect that makes the growth 
contribution from ICT capital deepening peculiar is the large cross-
country variation of this contribution. Among the four largest EU 
countries, the UK clearly stands out for having enjoyed the largest 
contribution across all sectors of Market services.
 
3.2  Productive investment in Market services
While employment has played an important role in propelling growth in 
Market services, at least in some sub-sectors, capital deepening has also 
been very influential. As Figure 7 below illustrates, investment in 
productive fixed capital is as high relative to value added in Market 
services as in Manufacturing. 3, 4
Productive investment totalled 18 percent of value added for the 
economy as a whole. At close to 19 percent of value added, both Market 
services and Manufacturing were close to the whole-economy aggregate. 
In contrast, only 15 percent of output was invested in “Social services” 
(not shown).
3    For the remainder of this chapter, EU refers to those 11 EU countries for which EUKLEMS provides 
detailed sector-asset breakdowns for investment and capital stocks. These are Austria, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK.
4    Tangible investment is known to be more pro-cyclical than output. Thus the share of investment 
in value added tends to be lower in recessions and higher in booms. In 2005, however, the output 
gap in the EU was closed according to the latest estimates by the EU Commission (AMECO) and, 
hence, overall capacity utilisation was normal. Therefore, the investment shares presented in the 
following are, by and large, representative.20             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
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Source:  EUKLEMS; own calculations
While the overall investment intensities of Manufacturing and Market 
services are very similar, the composition of investment is not. Some two-
thirds of productive investment in manufacturing consists of “other 
equipment”, while it is the smallest component in Market services. 
Instead, productive investment in Market services is dominated by non-
residential construction, followed by ICT and Transport equipment. 
Figure 7 also shows that both the level and the composition of investment 
differs notably across the different sub-sectors of Market services. This 
reflects the different characteristics of individual service industries. In 
terms of the asset composition of investment in individual Market 
services sectors, the example of the Transport and Communication sector 
is particularly intuitive. Half of the investment in this sector is devoted 
to non-residential construction (e.g. street, rail, port and airport 
infrastructure, warehouses, offices). Another quarter is used for transport 
equipment to renew fleets of trucks, plains, ships, rolling stock etc. Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  21           
Moreover, at 6 percent the sector comes second only to Finance in the 
share of value added that is invested in ICT equipment even though ICT 
is allocated only a small fraction of the sector’s large overall investment 
budget. By contrast, in Finance, two thirds of investment was devoted to 
ICT equipment. 
Turning now to the geographic dimension, there are notable differences 
in the level of investment in Market services across countries. As shown 
in Figure 8, the US and Japan invested considerably less in Market services 
(11 percent and 12½ percent, respectively) than the EU. But also the 
variation across EU countries was large, with the productive-investment 
share ranging from 11½ percent in the Netherlands to some 25 percent in 
the economies in transition (Czech Republic and Slovenia). Italy, Austria 
and Portugal had above-average investment, too, mostly due to very 
high investment in non-residential construction.
Figure 8:    Productive investment by asset, Market services (percent 
of value added, 2005)
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There are also interesting differences across countries in terms of the 
composition of investment by asset type. The well-known “ICT spenders” 
such as Denmark, Sweden, the UK and the US, devoted some 
30-40 percent of fixed investment in Market services to ICT equipment, 
compared with just 20 percent for the EU as a whole. This is noteworthy, 
as these countries have also registered the largest growth contributions 
from ICT capital deepening for the economy as a whole, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. Moreover, in the UK and the US in particular, labour 
productivity in the service sector has grown substantially faster than in 
other countries. It is also worth noting that in all four countries overall 
investment relative to value added in Market services is well below the 
EU average. 
The Czech Republic and Germany, in turn, may be characterized as 
“Transport equipment spenders”. Other equipment tends to make for a 
relatively large share of investment in the ICT-intensive market sectors of 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK. Finally, non-residential constructions were 
particularly dominant in Italy and Portugal (see above) but also in 
Finland. 
3.3  Capital intensity in the service sector
Different types of capital assets have very different lifespans. High 
investment in short-lived asset types, such as ICT, translates into a smaller 
capital stock than would a corresponding level of investment in long-
lived assets such as non-residential buildings. Because of the large 
differences in asset composition across sectors, we therefore need to 
look also at the stock of capital that each worker is equipped with, before 
deciding on whether a sector is fixed capital intensive or not.Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  23           
Figure 9:    Productive capital per person employed in the EU, by 
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Source:  EUKLEMS; own calculations
While broadly corresponding to the investment levels seen earlier, the 
capital stocks per employee shown in Figure 9 display some notable 
differences. First, as expected, the share of non-residential construction 
in the total capital stock is higher than its share in investment, as a 
result of its higher longevity relative to other assets. Second, the 
amount of capital per employee is higher in Market services than in 
Manufacturing, despite similar levels of total investment. This result 
follows directly from the higher share of construction in Market services 
investment. Among the sub-sectors within Market services, Transport & 
Communication stands out as the most capital-intensive sector, 
mirroring both its higher total level of investment and its large 
component of construction. To illustrate, each person working in that 
sector is equipped with approximately EUR 210,000 of productive 
tangible capital, compared with less than EUR 40,000 in Trade and 
Tourism.24             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
Mirroring differences in investment intensity, the capital intensity of 
Market services differs markedly across countries. However, capital stocks 
per worker vary even more strongly across countries than investment. At 
close to EUR 180,000 per worker, Denmark’s Market services are twice as 
capital intensive as the EU average and 4½ times as capital intensive as 
Market services in Slovenia. Second, unlike for investment, Japan is more 
capital intensive than the EU, and there is now only a small difference 
between the EU and the US. Third, there are striking cross-country 
differences in per-worker endowment with machinery and (transport) 
equipment, suggesting that within Market services, countries are 
specialised on different sectors requiring different asset types. Last but 
not least, endowment with ICT equipment greatly differs from one 
country to the next. 
Figure 10:    Productive capital in EU Market services per person 
employed (1000s of EUR, 2005)
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3.4  Concluding remarks
Starting from the observation that tangible investment has made a 
substantial contribution to labour productivity in Market services since 
1995, this chapter has analysed patterns of tangible investment and 
capital intensity in Market services. Among the main insights are that 
Market services are as capital intensive as Manufacturing and that Market 
services devote a larger share of resources to ICT capital than other 
segments of the economy. Business services, in particular, have seen a 
productivity-enhancing shift in capital structure towards more ICT and 
less “brick and mortar” without increasing the overall capital stock per 
worker. Those countries that have experienced rapid increases in labour 
productivity in Market services are characterized by a particularly large 
share of ICT equipment in overall tangible investment. But we also need 
to caution against overgeneralisations, since Market services include a 
rather heterogeneous set of activities. Transport & Communication, for 
example, is capital intensive, while Trade and Tourism is labour intensive.  
  Intangible capital and economic  4. 
growth
The traditional concept of productive fixed capital includes tangible 
assets such as non-residential buildings and machinery and equipment. 
But from an economic point of view, this is a rather too narrow definition 
of productive fixed capital. In principle, capital expenditure should 
include any outlay that increases future output and income at the 
expense of current consumption. Investment in R&D for example gives 
rise to a productive capital stock similar to tangible fixed capital. The 
same argument can be made for investment in human capital, in the 
form of education and training. Human capital and R&D capital are key 
components of the economy’s “intangible capital”, but this concept can 
be broadened even further. 26             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
The exclusion of intangible capital from traditional measures of the fixed 
capital stock was to a large extent caused by a lack of reliable data. 
Intangible investment and capital tend to be more difficult to measure 
than tangible fixed capital. For much of the post-war period, this 
exclusion was not a great concern. Most advanced economies were 
manufacturing-based and tangible capital accounted for the bulk of the 
total productive capital stock. Over time, however, the exclusion of 
intangible capital from official statistics has led to a growing 
misrepresentation of the economic growth process. The reason is that 
many advanced economies have shifted away from traditional 
manufacturing towards services and towards economic activity that is 
increasingly knowledge-based. Growth in modern post-industrial 
countries has become increasingly dependent on investment in human 
capital, knowledge and other forms of intangible capital. It is estimated 
that intangible assets now account for between one third to half the 
market value of the US corporate sector. In Europe the share of intangible 
assets in the total assets of publicly-listed firms has more than tripled 
since the early 1990s, to around 30 percent. Even this figure understates 
the true share of intangible assets, however, because accounting 
standards do not allow for treating R&D as capital, and because only 
intangible assets which are actually on the balance sheet are measured. 
Hall et al. (2007) show, on the basis of just over 1000 publicly-listed 
European firms, that investment in R&D is a fundamental determinant of 
corporate financial value and competitive advantage. These findings are 
in line with other studies on US firms showing that investors view R&D as 
an asset rather than as an expense. 
The growing role for intangibles is visible also at the macroeconomic 
level, which suggests that their exclusion from national accounts entails a 
growing misrepresentation of economic activity. Neither the system of 
national accounts (SNA) nor the financial accounting of firms have 
traditionally allowed for the capitalisation of intangibles, for both 
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the stock of R&D or human capital is often tacit, i.e. embedded in the 
skilled staff and researchers of firms. Also, such expenditures often 
contain a mix of genuine capital investment (which should be capitalised) 
and intermediate consumption (which should not be). Some fear that 
companies might be tempted to label almost any kind of expenditure a 
“capital expenditure” in order to improve their standing with investors. In 
contrast, conventional fixed investment and the capital stock it generates 
is relatively easy to distinguish. 
Some steps have been taken towards the capitalisation of intangible 
investment in the SNA. Expenditures on computer software, for example, 
have already been counted as capital expenditure for a decade. Software 
benefits from relatively easy measurement and is relatively distinguishable 
as pure capital expenditure. It was also decided in 2008 to start counting 
R&D as investment, to be implemented in a few years time.
Given the limited coverage of intangibles in official SNA statistics, 
economic researchers have relied on a combination of private and public 
information sources to estimate such investment. Most have chosen the 
template created by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2009), henceforth 
referred to as CHS. They include three types of intangible assets for the 
US economy: 
Computerised information   •  (software and databases);
Scientific and creative property   •  (R&D, mineral exploration, copyright 
and license costs, other product development, design, and other research 
expenses);
Economic competencies   •  (brand equity, firm-specific human capital 
and organisational structure). 
On this basis, they estimate total annual investment in intangible assets 
by US businesses in the late 1990s to have amounted to some USD 1.1 
trillion, or 12 percent of GDP. This is a substantial figure, a similar order of 
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important result of their exercise: Once the definition of capital is 
broadened to include all forms of expenditure that raise the future 
output potential of the economy, business sector investment is actually 
twice as large as that traditionally reported.
The data collected by CHS also suggest that US investment in intangibles 
has risen markedly over time. This gradual rise in intangible investment 
has been of the same order of magnitude as the decline in tangible 
investment, thus keeping the ratio of total investment to GDP relatively 
stable over time. Not all segments of intangible investment have 
contributed equally to this expansion however. Comparing the time 
period 1973–1995 with 1995–2003, CHS find that overall intangible 
investment grew from 9.4 percent of total national income to 13.9 percent. 
Computerised information rose the most, from 0.8 to 2.3 percent. 
Interestingly, while traditional scientific R&D remained flat at around 2½ 
percent, “non-scientific R&D” rose from 1 to 2.2 percent. Non-scientific 
R&D includes innovative and artistic content in the form of commercial 
copyrights, licenses, and designs, which are not counted in traditional 
R&D statistics. Investment in brand equity rose from 1.7 to 2 percent, 
while that in firm-specific resources increased from 3.5 to 5 percent. In 
other words, while scientific R&D is traditionally seen as the key element 
in knowledge creation, it has made a negligible contribution to the 
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Box 2:    The neo-classical growth model and growth accounting
The most common method used to empirically investigate the 
composition of economic growth is called growth accounting, 
drawing on the neo-classical model of the economy developed 
simultaneously by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956). In the neoclassical 
production function gross output is a simple function of only two 
factors of production: capital and labour. These two are smoothly 
but imperfectly substitutable, as can be exemplified by the 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
 (1)  Y=AKαL1-α
What this function says is that aggregate output can be expanded 
either by increasing the amount of labour (L) or fixed capital (K) 
used in production, or through an expansion of the stock of 
knowledge (A). The function above has constant returns to scale. 
This means that a doubling of both capital and labour also leads to 
a doubling of output. At the same time there are diminishing 
returns to individual inputs (i.e. α<1). Because of diminishing 
marginal returns to capital, the marginal contribution to growth 
from steadily increasing the capital stock for each worker will be 
smaller and smaller. Consequently, the only way for the neoclassical 
economy to keep growing on a per capita basis is by continuously 
expanding the stock of knowledge.
The seminal contribution of Solow was his pioneering empirical 
work on growth accounting. Applying his model to US data from 
the first half of the 20th century, Solow (1957) could calculate the 
shares of growth that stemmed directly from the expansion of 
labour and fixed capital#. Whatever portion of growth that cannot 
be directly explained as the result of increased factor inputs must, 
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stock of knowledge. Solow’s startling discovery was that, indeed, 
some nine-tenths of US growth could not be explained by the 
expansion of labour and capital, but was captured by the residual 
A. While knowledge is certainly one key element of this residual, 
this interpretation may in fact be a bit too narrow, since empirically 
the residual captures all efficiency gains in the use of factors of 
production. The residual captures all increases in output for a given 
combination of factor inputs. Hence it is nowadays often referred 
to simply as “total factor productivity”, or TFP. 
Modern growth research has found that one reason the TFP residual 
accounted for such a large portion of growth in Solow’s calculations 
was that early measures of fixed capital were rather too narrow. By 
broadening the concept and measurement of capital, the 
unexplained TFP residual can be reduced*. 
#    In order to do this using the relatively simple neo-classical production function and the 
limited set of data at his disposal, Solow had to make a few simplifying assumptions. First, 
he assumed that the US economy was on its equilibrium growth path, not unreasonably 
given its long history of having a relatively free market economy. This allowed him to draw 
on some generalised properties of the production function that are only true in equilibri-
um and under the additional assumption of perfect competition. Under these circum-
stances, the wage rate equals the marginal productivity of labour and the rate of return on 
capital equals the marginal productivity of capital. The income shares reflect the output 
elasticity of each input. Assuming constant returns to scale, they add up to one. These are 
the α and 1-α shown in equation (1). Consequently, while the output elasticities are not 
directly observable, one can simply calculate the contribution of an input to output 
growth as the growth rate of each input (capital and labour) multiplied by its own income 
share, which is observable. 
*    A more comprehensive review of the modern growth literature is provided in Uppenberg 
(2009).
Based on their estimates of intangible investment, CHS estimate the size 
of the intangible capital stock, which is then incorporated into the 
standard growth accounting framework first developed by Solow (see 
Box 2). As illustrated by Figure 11, productivity growth is higher in the 
presence of intangible capital. The reason is that spending on intangibles, Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  31           
which grew faster than other segments of the economy, is now included 
in measured output. It was not when viewed merely as intermediate 
consumption. Another consequence of treating intangibles as capital 
expenditure is that it dramatically changes the observed sources of 
economic growth. Capital deepening – increases in the stock of capital 
per hour worked – now becomes the dominant source of growth. For the 
period 1995-2003, intangible and tangible capital investment account for 
broadly equal shares of growth in US output per worker. 
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Source:   Corrado et al. (2009)
With capital deepening explaining a larger share of growth, the 
contribution from the TFP residual becomes correspondingly smaller, 
falling from around half to one-third for the post-1995 period when 
intangibles are included. The Solow residual also accounts for a smaller 
portion of the post-1995 acceleration in US growth. When intangibles are 
excluded, some two-thirds of the increase in growth is accounted for by 32             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
TFP. Its share drops to just over one-third when intangibles are included. 
On balance, this research is suggestive of the very substantial role that 
investment in intangibles has played in US economic growth.
The CHS methodology was consequently applied by Giorgio Marrano 
and Haskel (2007) for the UK, by Fukao et al. (2009) for Japan, by Jalava et 
al. (2007) for Finland and by Edquist (2009) for Sweden. In all of these 
cases, total investment in intangible capital stood at around 10 percent 
of GDP, i.e. a similar order of magnitude as in the US. However, when this 
methodology has been applied to a larger number of continental 
European countries, a wider range of results has emerged. 
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Source:    van Ark et al. (2009); Edquist (2009); Fukao et al. (2009); Jalava et al. (2007); Van Rooijen-
Horsten et al. (2008)
In the EU, with the exception of the countries mentioned above, both the 
resources devoted to intangible investment and their contribution to 
productivity growth have typically been of a smaller magnitude. This is Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  33           
one of the key findings of van Ark et al. (2009). Building on existing 
estimates of intangible capital for the US and several European countries, 
van Ark and his co-authors extend the estimates of intangible investment 
and capital to five additional European countries: Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Greece and Slovakia. The concept of intangible 
capital follows the template of CHS for the US. Figure 12 provides a 
comparison of intangible investment in the US, Japan and a number of 
European countries, drawing on the results of van Ark et al. and other 
studies using the CHS methodology.
We see here that the ratio of intangible investment to GDP varies 
markedly across countries, not least within the EU. Also the composition 
of intangible investment varies across countries. Economic competencies 
account for as much as half of total intangible investment in the US, UK 
and the Netherlands, while innovative property such as copyrights and 
licenses tend to dominate in Japan and a large number of continental EU 
countries.
Figure 13:    Intangible and tangible investment in the market sector 
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Figure 13 above compares the size of intangible investment with tangible 
investment across a selection of countries. As seen earlier for the US, 
intangible investment is of a similar order of magnitude as tangible 
investment in the Nordic countries and in the three biggest EU economies. 
In many other EU economies, however, investment in intangibles remains 
far below tangible investment. 
Figure 14:    Contribution of inputs to labour productivity growth 
(annual average in percent, 1995-2006)

































































Source: van Ark et al. (2009)
Just as the level of intangible investment varies across countries, so does 
its impact on economic growth. As shown in Figure 14, intangible capital 
deepening (i.e. more intangible capital per unit of labour) contributed 
0.7-0.8 percentage points to labour productivity growth in the US, UK, 
Denmark and the Czech Republic in 1995-2006. In Germany, France and 
Austria the growth contribution was slightly smaller, ranging between 
0.4 and 0.6 percentage points. The smallest contributions to productivity 
growth were found in Italy, Spain and Greece, where it averaged only Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  35           
0.1-0.2 percentage points during this period. The figure also illustrates 
how non-ICT capital deepening has been delegated to a minor role in 
growth during this period, with the notable exceptions of the Czech 
Republic and Greece.
To sum up, this literature shows that the exclusion of intangible 
investment generates a growing misrepresentation of growth in 
economies specialising in knowledge-intensive production. The more 
complete accounting of intangibles undertaken in recent research has 
demonstrated that the business sector sets aside a much larger share of 
their total resources to investment than conventional capital measures 
would have us believe. This modification, in turn, has substantially 
affected our perception of the drivers of economic growth. It makes both 
the accumulation of knowledge and its contribution to economic growth 
more explicit. Indeed, the inclusion of intangibles in aggregate 
investment shows that a substantial portion of growth can be accounted 
for by such investment. 
But the diversity of intangible investment levels across countries is also 
indicative of the highly varying speeds at which different countries are 
making the transition to knowledge-based economies. Although a 
sectoral breakdown is not available for these data, intangible investment 
has tended to be particularly high in those countries where the services 
sector has made a large contribution to productivity growth. Notable 
examples are the UK, the US, the Netherlands and some of the Nordic 
countries. The positive correlation between the level of intangible 
investment and the role of services as a growth engine suggests that 
high aggregate productivity growth will be difficult to achieve in 
countries with low intangible investment and stagnant productivity in 
the services sector. This is an important observation to consider if Europe 
as a whole is to succeed in its ambition to catch up with US productivity 
growth in coming years. The next chapter will take a closer look at the 
nature of innovation in the business services sector, and how public 
policy can be tailored to support innovation in services specifically.36             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
Innovation in the services sector 5. 
We have earlier presented evidence that the services sector is becoming 
increasingly important for economic growth, in terms of both 
employment and productivity. It also accounts for a substantial portion 
of the outperformance of fast-growing advanced countries in recent 
years, disregarding for now any repositioning that the economic 
downturn may cause. A better understanding of the drivers of 
productivity growth in services is therefore important if Europe as a 
whole is to improve its productivity performance. We have seen above 
that investment in both tangible and intangible capital plays a role. 
Investment in ICT, in particular, is instrumental in facilitating productivity 
enhancing innovation in services. But there is also strong evidence in the 
economics literature that these productivity gains arise only when the 
new ICT hardware and software is accompanied by organisational 
changes. In a recent study of the US economy, Oliner et al. (2007) observe 
that ICT and intangible capital deepening accounted for a large share of 
US productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s. But they also 
show that this influence diminished in the first half of the 2000s in favour 
of total factor productivity (TFP), i.e. the increased efficiency with which 
factor inputs are used. This shift is consistent with the view that 
productivity enhancing organisational changes may lag the investments 
that enable them. Hence there is more to innovation -- not least in 
services -- than installing more and better machinery. This chapter 
therefore takes a closer look at how the services sector innovates. 
5.1    Innovation has recently been redefined to 
better fit its role in services
Analysis on innovation has always tended to centre on manufacturing. 
Both statistical services and economic research have historically 
underplayed the role of innovation in services. The realisation that services 
play a substantial role in growth makes this stance untenable, however. 
Efforts have recently been made to better account for innovation in services. Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  37           
One prominent example of this is the third edition of the “Oslo Manual” 
(OECD, 2005) which provides a revised definition of innovation which is 
better tailored to its role in service industries. Specifically, it has been 
obvious for some time that innovation in services is more geared towards 
organisational changes than towards the development of new products 
and processes. Indeed, it is an inherent feature of services that the final 
product is difficult to distinguish from the organisation that provides it, 
or from the manner in which it is provided.
To account for this, the revised Oslo Manual broadens the definition of 
innovation to mean “the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, 
or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace 
organisation or external relations.“
This implicitly identifies the following four types:
Product innovation   • : the introduction of a good or service that is 
new or significantly improved with respect to its characteristics or 
intended uses.
Process innovation   • : the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved production or delivery method.
Marketing innovation   • : the implementation of a new marketing 
method involving significant changes in product design or packaging, 
product placement, product promotion or pricing.
Organisational innovation   • : the implementation of a new 
organisational method in the firm’s business practices, workplace 
organisation or external relations. 
The first two are traditionally more closely related to technological 
innovation. The last two are non-technological in nature. These are new 
additions to the third edition of the Oslo Manual.38             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
5.2    Manufacturing and services focus on different 
types of innovation
The revised definition of innovation has been applied in recent surveys, 
providing improved measurement of innovation in services. The latest 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS-2006, conducted by Eurostat on 
behalf of the European Commission) shows clearly that a too narrow 
definition of innovation (limited to technological innovation) would 
underestimate the occurrence of innovation in services.
The survey identifies “in-house” innovation as that which is mainly 
developed within the firm. On this score, the number of firms engaged in 
in-house product innovation (products that are new to both the firm 
and the market) is on average around one-third lower in services than in 
manufacturing, as shown in Figure 15.
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The gap between services and manufacturing is somewhat smaller (one-
quarter) as regards the percentage of firms engaged in process 
innovation (Figure 16). 



























































































































































Source:  OECD STI Scoreboard 2009
The gap between manufacturing and services virtually disappears, 
finally, in the percentage of firms that engage in non-technological 
innovation such as a marketing or organisational innovation (chart 17 
below). Note that the percentage of firms involved in such innovation is 
also much higher across the board than in the case of product or process 
innovation.40             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 




































































































































Source:  OECD STI Scoreboard 2009
5.3    Average firm size in services is smaller, and 
they benefit from clustering
The CIS-2006 also shows that a lower percentage of SMEs engage in 
innovation than do large firms. This should be born in mind when 
assessing the lower incidence of innovation in services. Most firms in the 
services sector are relatively small. On average in the EU-27, around three-
quarters of service sector value added are generated by firms with less 
than 250 employees (i.e. SMEs and micro-sized firms). In manufacturing, 
the SME/micro share of total value added is only around one-half. 
Smaller firms tend to devote less resources to in-house innovation, 
whether in the form of scientific R&D or other types of intangible 
investment. Typically lacking the resources for substantial internal 
innovation, they are more dependent on externally generated innovation Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  41           
and technology, for example off-the-shelf software and IT hardware. 
They also benefit from sharing the costs of innovation and infrastructure 
with other similar firms, which suggests that they are prone to 
clustering. 
The European Cluster Observatory (financed by the Commission in the 
framework of its Europe INNOVA initiative) has shown that clustering in 
services is highly correlated with GDP per capita. This is most evident for 
clusters in business services, financial services and information 
technology. Evidence for positive effects from clustering in services is 
indicative of what “eco-systems” allow innovative services to flourish. 
Figure 18 illustrates this point. The 2006 Innobarometer survey showed 
that a larger portion of services sector firms gave their cluster credit for 
their own innovation (dark blue) than did industrial firms.
Figure 18:  Clustering helps services innovate
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5.4    Some services are more innovative than 
others
One problem with assessing innovation in services is that it includes a 
very heterogeneous group of activities. Some types of services are 
particularly uninnovative, which pulls down the average. Services with 
high levels of technological opportunity, such as computer services, 
telecommunications, transport and R&D and engineering services stand 
at the core of what Eurostat calls “Knowledge Intensive Services” (KIS). 
Eurostat’s definition of KIS is relatively broad, which has the effect that it 
covers around half of total service sector employment and one-third of 
total employment in the EU (Figure 19).
Figure 19:    Employment in knowledge-intensive service sectors 









Source:  PRO INNO Europe paper No. 12, 2009
Unlike the services sector as a whole, the KIS segment is not that different 
from manufacturing in terms of R&D intensity or the share of output that 
comes from new products. The KIS segment is important for aggregate 
productivity growth, and there is a strong positive correlation between Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  43           
the employment share of the KIS and GDP per capita, as shown in Figure 
20. The causality here likely goes in both directions, i.e. rich countries 
may have higher aggregate demand for KIS services. However, we have 
seen earlier that services contribute very differently to aggregate 
productivity growth across countries, and the employment share of KIS is 
also strongly correlated with overall innovation scores. This suggests that 
knowledge intensive services do play a non-negligible part in overall 
services sector innovation, and in its contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth.
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5.5    How do service sector firms innovate? Results 
from the NESTA innovation survey
Because of the heterogeneity of service industries, it is difficult to 
generalise too much about their innovative process. We therefore now 
turn to take a closer look at how a sample of individual service industries 44             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
conduct their innovation. This section draws on a UK survey, which 
usefully distinguishes between different stages of the “innovation value 
chain”, from the formation of knowledge all the way through to commercial 
applications and value creation, which in turn is the basis for measuring 
productivity. This is helpful, as different industries with similar overall levels 
of innovation may focus on different stages of the value chain.
That innovation should be reflected in value creation was first suggested 
by Joseph Schumpeter, who argued that innovation is not just a new idea 
or invention, but the increased productivity that stems from its 
application. Innovation is thus inseparable from the economic value that 
it generates. This is a very serviceable definition of innovation, since it 
makes it measurable in quantitative/monetary terms. By any other 
measure, how could one possibly compare two different inventions?
The study, by the UK National Endowment for Science, Technology and 
the Arts (NESTA, 2009), draws on a survey of 1500 UK companies. It covers 
nine sectors, selected to provide a representative cross-section of the 
economy. These include both industries that are believed ex ante to be 
knowledge-intensive and those that are not. 
The nine sectors included in the survey are:
Automotive sector   •
Specialist design    •
Construction    •
Energy production    •
Accountancy services    •
Architectural services    •
Consultancy services    •
Legal services    •
Software & IT services    •
Of these, the last five are in services (shown in blue in the list). Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  45           
Sectors innovate differently, emphasising different stages of the 
innovation value chain. The NESTA survey identifies three distinct 
phases: 
Accessing knowledge   •  (through in-house investment in knowledge, 
collaboration with other organisations, or acquisition of external 
knowledge);
Building innovation capacity   •  (as firms translate their knowledge 
investments into innovation outputs); 
Commercialisation/value creation   •  (as firms seek to exploit their 
innovations in the market place).
In order to measure the innovative capabilities of each sector, in each of 
the three stages, the survey identifies a number of metrics assessed at 
firm level. In order to measure each sector’s innovativeness through the 
innovation value chain, the survey covers the 16 firm-level metrics. Many 
of these elements are particular to each of the three stages. For example, 
the Accessing Knowledge stage includes metrics reflecting the firm’s 
internal R&D and design expenditure. Building Innovation includes 
spending on process change and the extent of new products and services 
in total sales. Commercialising Innovation includes metrics relevant to 
successfully taking an innovation to market, such as the nature of 
involvement with customers and the use of IP protection. Then there are 
also metrics that are common across all three stages. For example, the 
use of different internal skill groups and the use of external partners are 
not limited to a specific stage. 
In a second step, the firm-level metrics are weighed and translated into 
sectoral innovation indices, as shown in Figure 21. These are constructed 
with the aim of allowing for a comparison of the level and variability of 
innovativeness across sectors, and across the three stages of the 
innovation value chain. In addition, the variation of firms in each sector is 
used as a measure of the scope for knowledge transfer within sectors. 46             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
These results are then used as an indication of the potential for 
productivity gains through the adoption of best practice, either within or 
across sectors.
While some sectors have an evenly high level of innovative capacity 
across all three stages (most notably IT and Consultancy services), others 
are more uneven (Automotive and Specialist design, along with several 
service industries).
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Source:  NESTA (2009)
5.6    Improving innovative capabilities by learning 
from best practice
The guiding principle of the NESTA survey was that the innovation 
capability of individual sectors can be enhanced by learning from best Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  47           
practice, whether residing inside the sector or in other sectors. If such 
learning does not occur spontaneously, there may be a role for the 
government to serve as a facilitator. The approach taken by NESTA is 
consistent with the view that technological innovation plays a secondary 
role in services sector innovation, as implied by the CIS results discussed 
earlier. If true, the allocation of resources (whether public or private) to 
the creation of new scientific knowledge is likely less effective in the 
context of fostering services sector innovation than the dissemination of 
best practice and knowledge spillovers, for instance through cluster 
formation.
In the NESTA framework, the scope for intersectoral learning is proxied by 
the gap of each sector and stage relative to that with the highest score, 
which is assumed to represent economy-wide best practice for each 
stage of the innovation value chain. The scope for learning from best 
practice within each sector is represented by the standard deviation of 
firm scores within each sector. is mapping provides a guide to sector-
specific strategies for lifting innovative capacity through the adoption of 
best practice. 
On this basis, four sectors stand out as having rather extreme profiles. 
Accountancy and construction display very large inter-sectoral gaps for 
each stage of the innovation value chain, suggesting greater scope for 
inter-sectoral learning of innovation best practice. At the same time, 
however, accountancy and construction firms have relatively low intra-
sector variability, which implies limited scope for learning from other 
firms in their own sectors. At the other extreme, consultancy and 
software/IT services have small or non-existent gaps to best practice for 
each element of the value chain. Consultancy firms also have relatively 
low intra-sector variability, which implies limited scope also for intra-
sector learning. Firms in the software and IT services sector, on the other 
hand, display a greater degree of intra-sector variability in their 
innovation capability. Here there is greater scope for learning from best 
practice within the software and IT services sector itself. Other sectors 48             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
fall in between these extremes. Architectural services display low 
variability within the sector but a relatively large inter-sectoral gap. If this 
sector is to improve its innovative capabilities, it would have to draw on 
best practice in other sectors, for instance consultancy and specialist 
design. The latter stands to gain relatively more from intra-sector 
learning, on account of its greater intra-sector variation.
One key observation made in the NESTA study is that the need to learn 
from and adopt best innovation practice is not always equal across all 
three stages of the innovation value chain. Relatively few sectors have 
large gaps to best practice in the first and third stages of the innovative 
value chain. In the second stage, however (“Building Innovation 
Capacity”), only two sectors have small gaps to best practice. This 
suggests that particular policy attention is needed in improving the 
ability of firms to build on their knowledge investments to generate 
more commercially viable innovative products and services.
5.7  Innovative firms grow faster
One final finding of the NESTA survey is that firms with high innovative 
capacity expanded substantially faster on average than non-innovative 
firms (Figure 22). The gap is also visible in services (except in architecture, 
where the innovative lead is relatively small). To the extent that the UK 
can serve as a role model for the rest of Europe, this suggests that 
broadening the innovative capability of firms in the services sector holds 
the key to faster service sector-led growth.
Possible methodological shortcomings notwithstanding, the NESTA 
study does provide a telling illustration of how individual service 
industries differ, not only in their overall innovative capacity, but also in 
their focus on the different stages of the innovation value chain. One 
lesson here is for instance that sectors suffering from structural 
weaknesses in the commercialisation of knowledge would enjoy limited 
benefits from increased investment in the creation of new knowledge. Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  49           
These results point to an alternative role for public policy in the context 
of service sector innovation, as a facilitator of learning from best practice, 
as opposed to supporting investment in R&D and in-house generation of 
new knowledge.
Figure 22:    Sales growth for UK innovators and non-innovators,  
by sector (annual percent growth, 2006-2009)
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Conclusions 6. 
The various sections of this survey paper have individually made some 
striking observations. Services account for a non-negligible portion of 
the productivity lead of highly innovative economies, most notably the 
US (Chapter 2). While Europe on average does not lag behind in terms of 
fixed tangible investment in the services sector, the shift towards ICT 
equipment has been even more pronounced in the US than in Europe 
(Chapter 3). Europe does lag the US with respect to intangible investment, 
and especially in economic competencies (Chapter 4). Given the large 
role that intangible investment has played in US productivity growth in 
the past decade-and-a-half, this imbalance needs to be addressed if the 50             Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector
 
transatlantic productivity gap is to be narrowed. The academic literature 
points to strong synergies between tangible fixed capital, investment in 
knowledge and in human and organisational capital. An imbalance in the 
resources allocated to tangible vs. intangible capital may therefore 
hamper the final productivity-payoff. But innovation in services is not 
just about the resources allocated to ICT and intangible investment. In 
order to boost productivity, service industries must draw on these 
investments to reshape the way they conduct business, and to invent 
entirely new services. For such innovation to occur, appropriate 
framework conditions must be in place, including product and labour 
market flexibility, competition, and free trade of services across borders. 
In services as in other industries, survival and the ambition to outrun the 
competition is the most powerful incentive to innovate.
A final conclusion that emerges from the literature and data surveyed 
above is that the nature of knowledge formation itself is different in 
services. Although some service industries do invest substantial amounts 
in scientific R&D, many do not. Average firm size in most service industries 
is small and the resources devoted to in-house knowledge creation are 
limited. Instead, surveys show that services rely extensively on external 
sources for new knowledge, most notably through their ties with 
customers and other firms. Yet the widespread lack of patenting of non-
technological innovations tends to limit the dissemination of such 
knowledge. As discussed in Chapter 5, many service industries would 
stand to gain substantially from learning from best practice in other firms 
and even in other sectors, yet many are relatively closed to information 
sharing and cooperation, partly for competitive reasons. The lack of 
effective IP protection for non-technological innovation raises the risk of 
suboptimal levels of knowledge transfers and wasteful duplication of 
innovative efforts, protected by secrecy. In light of these observations, 
public support for the dissemination of best practice and the formation 
of knowledge intensive service clusters are attractive complements to 
traditional R&D subsidies in fostering more innovation in the services 
sector.Innovation and productivity growth in the EU services sector  51           
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